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The self is something to write about, a theme or object (subject) of writing 
activity. 
- Michel Foucault (cited in Martin et al 1988: 27) 
Introduction 
This chapter engages with the notion of queer life writing. I say the notion of queer 
life writing because, as yet, a distinct queer life writing has not emerged as a robust 
literary genre or practice. Queer life writing at this stage is largely a proposition, an 
unfulfilled promise. At the heart of this promise is a life writing that contains a critical 
and radical deconstruction of identity, of heteronormativity and of binary gender and 
sexual norms. A queer life writing cannot be just autobiography or memoir produced 
by lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) people but writing by any 
person that consciously works against phallogocentric norms and also foregrounds the 
processes and practices of conscious self-making. Such a life writing would work 
against the idea that there is any essential or lasting nature to subjectivity and would 
counter the notion that certain subjectivities or identities are somehow inherently or 
meaningfully linked to certain (corresponding) bodies and biological sexes. As queer 
life writing is, for the most part, still only a promise, this chapter focuses on the 
theoretical context of such a writing rather than specific writing practices or 
examples.  
Queer self-making occurs within hostile heteronormative environments and is 
at odds with homonormativity as well. Because of this, queer life writing needs to be 
understood and contextualized not merely in relation to the literary tradition of life 
writing, but also in relation to the specifics of queer self-invention and expression and 
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its theoretical background. A truly queer life writing, unlike heterosexual and LGBTI 
life writing, would be unique in that it would be wholly inspired by a theoretical 
movement – Queer Theory. The only comparable body of work is feminist life 
writing. Thus, it is crucial to understand the foundational ideas of queer theory if we 
are to understand queer life writing and how it would differ from LGBTI or 
heteronormative life writing. 
 
To Begin at the Beginning 
Michel Foucault (1997) argues that who one is emerges out of the problems with 
which one struggles. Foucault advocates an ongoing investigation or struggle with the 
self—an ongoing assembly and disassembly of subjectivity—that constitutes a kind of 
self-bricolage; a making and re-making of subjectivity that can be seen as an aesthetic 
struggle towards an artistic ideal (Foucault 1997). Foucault describes this process as 
an ethics of the self (Foucault 1986). He illuminates the purpose of this process when 
he writes: 
…the intent is not to pursue the unspeakable, nor to reveal the hidden, nor to 
say the unsaid, but on the contrary to capture the already-said, to collect what 
one has managed to hear or read, and for a purpose that is nothing less than the 
shaping of the self (Foucault 1997, p. 208). 
In this sense, subjectivity itself can be seen as an aesthetic practice; the 
making of the self is an art. Foucault refers to this process, this ethics of the self, as an 
aesthetics of existence (Foucault 1997, Thompson 2003, p. 123). It could be said that 
all life writing emerges from such a struggle.  
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In fact, much of the work of self-(re)making has traditionally occurred in the 
creative arts, which have historically been a domain of self-enquiry, self-exploration 
and “self transformation”. Indeed, the Foucauldian notion of the subject and the 
creative text share fundamental characteristics: they are both discursive; they both 
pursue aesthetic goals; and, perhaps most significantly, they are both creative not only 
in form but also in the ways that they are constituted. Given this, writing, especially 
life writing, can be seen as an appropriate site for ethical interventions in subjectivity 
and for explorations into how we might remake ourselves in pleasing and radical 
ways.  
One of the principal examples Foucault gives of a technique used in such an 
ethics of the self— implemented to produce a desired or altered/transformed 
subject—is reflective writing (Foucault 1997). Specifically, Foucault uses a kind of 
life writing, the journal, as his prime example. This reflective life writing produces 
the desired subject through a process of self-analysis or reflexivity, of questioning the 
condition and conduct of the self in order to construct a subjectivity in line with one’s 
ethics (Ambrosio 2008). To put it simply, for Foucault certain kinds of life writing are 
a practice involved in the production and maintenance of the self (Baker 2013 & 
2015). As Faust (1988) argues, this can be said to be more so when that writing is 
informed or organised by a philosophy of some kind that is applied as a way of life.  
This is a direct reversal of the dominant or inherited model of the writer whose 
genius produces creative texts that are a direct reflection of that writer’s identity 
(Weisberg 1993). In this Foucauldian model, it is the practice of life writing, and the 
reading of texts and discourse, that produce the writer’s subjectivity; a subjectivity 
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that reflects not an essential, inner identity but rather the discourses with which it has 
engaged (or struggled). 
 
The Aesthetics of Existence: A Productive Ethics 
Ramos (1994) argues that, in Foucauldian thought, there is a clear distinction between 
moral and social codes (rules and precepts) and the practice of ethics. For Foucault, 
ethics is concerned with the kind of relationship one has to oneself, how one 
constitutes oneself as an ethical subject (Foucault 1997, Rabinow 1997). Thompson 
(2003) argues that Foucault saw freedom as a prerequisite for the practice of ethics 
and saw the practice of ethics as constituting a kind of freedom. By freedom, Foucault 
means simply the ability to choose one action or direction over another (Thompson 
2003). In this context, freedom is the ability to choose between one subjectivity 
and/or life trajectory over another. 
A Foucauldian ethics of the self is a ‘direct political response to 
normalization’s effect of blocking us from asserting an identity, a self, and a future of 
our own making’ (Infinito 2003, p. 160). Infinito argues that underlying a 
Foucauldian ethics is the fact that the ‘discursive construction of identity as internal 
and enduring serves to perpetuate existing power structures’ (2003, p. 163). 
Therefore, Foucault proposed an ethical practice that was a reworking of subjectivity. 
This subjectivity was one that was perpetually reforming itself and that capitalised on 
its own mutability and discursiveness. At the heart of this ethical practice was life 
writing (Baker 2013 & 2015). 
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Foucault’s model of ethics is not focussed on an external moral or social code 
but rather on subjects’ relationship with themselves (Rabinow 1997). This 
relationship has at its heart how subjects conduct themselves (Thompson 2003) and 
critically contemplate their own and others’ lives (Infinito 2003). In Foucauldian 
ethics, the subjects’ attention to conduct and contemplation or reflection on life 
through writing is linked to the notion of critique (Thompson 2003). Foucault posits 
that the purpose of critique is ‘to promote new forms of subjectivity through the 
refusal of the type of individuality that has been imposed on us for several centuries’ 
(cited in Thompson 2003, p. 122). This critique is harnessed to a process of self-
formation, or self-bricolage (Rabinow 1997), in which subjects fashion for themselves 
‘a mode of being’ that emerges from their own history and their own ‘critical and 
creative thinking and action’ (Infinito 2003, p.160). The action referred to here 
includes the practice of reflective life writing. 
Although Foucauldian ethics rejects external moral codes (Thompson 2003), 
and therefore is not extrinsic in character, it is not wholly internalised or obsessively 
introspective either.  A Foucauldian ‘care for the self’ does not exclude a concern and 
acknowledgement of the contribution to our own being—especially with regards to its 
constitution—of others. Thompson (2003, p. 125) illustrates this point when he 
writes: 
An “aesthetics of existence” means then that just as any technician, artisan, or 
artist, always crafts a new work under the guidance of critical scrutiny, 
examining what has been achieved thus far, recalling the rules of the art itself, 
and comparing the former against the latter, working under the direction of 
critical inspection, reminding ourselves constantly of the fundamental rule of 
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this unique art, the principle of autonomy, not, of course, as a judge, assessing 
guilt, but as a craftsperson shaping new forms of existence, always comparing 
what we’ve made for its fidelity to the project and activity of self-formation 
itself. 
In other words, an ethics of the self is a socially embedded creative practice 
that, although without an overarching moral trajectory, does have some aspects of 
“normalization” (Thompson 2003), though a normalization harnessed to the 
autonomy of self-formation (Baker 2013 & 2015). 
Thus, Infinito argues, ‘the locus of ethical activity is not in the solitary mind, 
nor even the will, but rather in the critical and creative capacities brought forth in 
praxis’ (Infinito 2003, p. 160). The critical and creative practice that Foucault saw as 
the principle field of this ethical activity, this aesthetics of existence, was a reflective 
writing focussed on examining one’s own life. 
 
Queer Life Writing as an Aesthetics of Existence 
Life writing as a genre and a discipline offers a clear example of the relationship 
between discourse and writing and the constitution of subjectivities in a Foucauldian 
ethics of the self (Baker 2013 & 2015). John Ambrosio (2008, p. 264), citing Faust, 
describes how writing acts on and with subjectivity when he argues: 
As a form of reflection and experimentation, writing is a technology of ethical 
self-formation that views the subject as a work of art and the self as an 
artefact, as an ongoing work in progress. When conjoined with a philosophical 
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“attitude of resistance that incites new ways of thinking about the forms of 
experience”, writing enables individuals to begin to “question and modify 
those systems which make only particular kinds of action possible. 
Queer Theory is such a ‘philosophical attitude of resistance’ that ‘incites new 
ways of thinking about… forms of experience’ (Faust 1988, p. 188) and which makes 
a wider range of actions and performativities possible. For those new to it, it is 
important to understand that queer theory has its origins in post-structuralism (Jagose 
1996) and employs a number of post-structuralism’s key ideas (Spargo 1999). As 
Spargo (1999, p. 41) argues, queer theory employs: 
Lacan’s psychoanalytic models of decentred, unstable identity, Jacques 
Derrida’s deconstruction of binary conceptual and linguistic structures, and… 
Foucault’s model of discourse, knowledge and power.  
Queer theory’s principle focus is the denaturalisation of categories/norms 
(Sullivan 2003, Jagose 1996, de Lauretis 1991) and abrading the borders between 
binary terms like male/female, natural/unnatural, normal/abnormal, 
heterosexual/homosexual, white/black, self/other. The work of Queer Theory is one of 
deconstruction (Spargo 1999, Jagose 1996); to dissect and alter how we think about 
and live core aspects of human subjectivity such as identity, sex/gender, race and 
sexuality. This work is undertaken in the context of a culture steeped in 
heteronormativity – the discourse and practice of presumed and privileged 
heterosexuality (Butler 1990, p. 106).  
Queer theory works to undermine the privileged position of heteronormativity 
(and homonormativity) by exposing the ways in which sexualities and genders are 
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produced in/by discourse and the ways in which non-normative genders and 
sexualities resist, transcend and trouble normative notions of sex, gender and 
sexuality categories that would otherwise be widely (mis)understood as somehow 
natural, essential or incontestable (Baker 2015). From a Queer Theory perspective, 
genders and sexualities (and subjectivities) are fluid, permeable, mutable and largely 
the result of repeatedly performed utterances, rituals and behaviors; or performativity 
(Butler 1993). 
Queer life writing, then, would be defined as a writing practice that 
foregrounds the performativity of subjectivities (especially in regard to genders and 
sexualities) and that produces texts which also foreground the performative whilst 
simultaneously denaturalizing categories or norms and abrading the borders between 
binary terms. Significantly, queer life writing would not frame the creative text as an 
expression of the internal identity of the author (Stephens 2009). Indeed, queer theory 
rejects the notion of stable identities altogether, especially when linked to biological 
sex. Instead, the queer (or homoerotic) content of a creative text would be seen as a 
discursive sexual non-normativity mobilized within the text to disrupt 
heteronormativity rather than as the (autobiographical) reflection of the author’s 
sexuality or identity/subjectivity (Stephens 2009).  
A queer life writing would also displace the entrenched and essentialist model 
of creative genius whilst simultaneously ‘disrupting the notion that discursive 
subjectivities appearing within literary texts are representations of the internal, stable 
identity of the creator’ (Baker 2011, p. 8). Instead, queer life writing would 
foreground the appearance of subjectivities within texts as a deployment or 
intervention into discourse for a critical or creative purpose (Baker 2011). Thus, the 
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writing of queer subjectivities into literature would not be seen as a reflection of a 
writer’s identity, a representation of some imagined ‘internal’ self, but rather ‘as a 
deliberate inscription and dissemination of non-normative discursive subjectivities’ 
(Baker 2011, p. 8).  
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, Foucault (1997) uses 
reflective life writing as an exemplar of a technique of the self implemented to 
produce a desired non-normative subjectivity. Foucault (1986) demonstrates how 
certain forms of reflective writing produce the subject through a process of critical 
self-analysis of one’s conduct and of one’s historical and social position. This self-
analysis, or critique, aligns the self with one’s ethics that are themselves formed in 
response to, and indeed in resistance to, dominant forms and norms of subjectivity 
(Ambrosio 2008, Thompson 2003, Martin et al 1988). This critique is undertaken 
principally in the act of writing about one’s life (Baker 2015). One’s analysis is 
written down, reflected over, and these writings are then used in the refinement of the 
self; in the production and maintenance of a new ethical subjectivity. Foucault 
demonstrates how this writing as self-formation has historically been tied to a 
philosophical or moral tradition in which the desired subjectivity was one in line with 
specific moral or philosophical tenets (Foucault 1986). This being the case, a 
reflective writing informed by Queer Theory can also be used in the process of self-
formation, as a queered aesthetics of existence applied as a way of life, in order to 
constitute new (and radical) queer subjectivities. 
According to Foucault (1996), ‘there is no sovereign, founding subject, a 
universal form of subject to be found everywhere’ but rather the subject/subjectivity 
is ‘constituted through practices of subjection, or, in a more autonomous way, through 
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practices of liberation, of liberty… on the basis, of course, of a number of rules, 
styles, inventions to be found in the cultural environment’ (452).  There is no 
‘authentic, foundational or necessary self waiting to be discovered and liberated’ 
(Ambrosio 2008, p. 253). Subjectivity (in particular gender and sexual subjectivity) is 
constituted in the interplay and correlation between ‘types of understanding, forms of 
normativity and modes of relation to oneself and others’ (Foucault 1986, p. 4). 
Furthermore, ‘subjects can occupy a variety of positions both “subject to” discipline 
and capable of “self-constitution”; albeit within the resources offered by his/her 
culture, society and social group’ (Foucault cited in Bailey 2005, p. 122). 
In this sense, self-bricolage through life writing would be a practice of liberty 
or practice of the self that, as an aspect of the queer cultural environment, would 
inform and alter the way subjects actively constituted themselves. In other words, 
works of life writing arising out of a queered aesthetics of existence would be 
“models” that ‘strongly influence the ongoing becoming of queer subjectivities’ 
(Baker 2011, p. 11). 
Drawing on Foucault, Judith Butler writes that ‘to understand identity as a 
practice, and as a signifying practice, is to understand culturally intelligible subjects 
as the resulting effect of a rule-bound discourse that inserts itself in the pervasive and 
mundane signifying acts of linguistic life’ (1990, p. 184) (emphasis original). 
Subjectivity, like creative writing, is a practice that is dynamic, reflective and 
creative. 
Butler (2004) further argues that an experience of an alternate or different 
subjectivity can ‘undo a prior conception of who one is only to inaugurate a relatively 
newer one’ (1). In other words, an experience of a non-normative subjectivity in 
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discourse or creative text can, to use Butler’s terminology, ‘undo’ one’s personhood 
and facilitate the emergence of a new subjectivity. Foucault described a similar 
process by which new subjectivities formed through the ‘appropriation, the 
unification, of a fragmentary and selected already said’ (1997, p. 209). In the context 
of Queer Theory, this process of undoing and/or (re)constituting subjectivities is an 
act of resistance against heteronormativity. This resistance, this re-making of identity, 
is not without limits or challenges; it is not total voluntarism (Butler 2004). As 
Ambrosio (2008, p. 255), pointing to some of these challenges and constraints, 
argues: 
We cannot transform ourselves through a simple act of knowing, through 
critical reason or reflection alone, but only by risking who we are, by… 
seeking out and testing ourselves in situations that illuminate the contours of 
our subjectivity, that destabilize our certainties…. Transforming the self 
requires that we act with personal courage and develop a tolerance for 
uncertainty and vulnerability. (emphasis original) 
This exposure to new subjectivities or discourses (the ‘already said’) can occur 
at the point of reception but also, significantly, in the performative moment of 
production, the moment of writing (Baker 2013 & 2015). The practice of writing can 
provide ‘a means by which individuals… transform themselves, reconstitute 
themselves as ethical subjects through reading, …reflection, and practical 
experimentation’ (Ambrosio 2008, p. 265). This process of ‘undoing’ in which new 
subjectivities emerge can be described as a ‘queering of the self’. 
It can be extrapolated then that a ‘queering of the self’—facilitated by 
exposure to Queer Theory in the context of an aesthetics of existence—can enrich and 
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inform one’s life writing practice; in effect bringing it into operation as part of a 
radical self-bricolage.  
This queering of the self/subjectivity is in effect a denaturalising of the self – 
a decoupling of identity from notions of the natural. In other words, a queered self is 
one in which subjectivity and identity are not conceived as somehow natural and 
stable but rather understood to be ambiguous, ephemeral, fluid and largely produced 
by discourse and bodily practices in relationship with socio-cultural factors. This 
conception of the self and subjectivity opens up the possibility of the life writer 
occupying a wider range of reading and writing ‘positions’ in ways that enrich both 
the creative act and the writer’s personal development. Movement into and out of 
these reading and writing positions is facilitated by the practice of writing and 
reflection (on what has been written) which are both techniques of a critique of the 
self (Baker 2013 & 2015). This practice of reflective life writing opens up new 
possibilities of experience, and facilitates the emergence of new forms of subjectivity, 
as Foucault (cited in Martin et al 1988, p. 28) describes with relation to the practice of 
reflective life writing in the Classical era:  
A relation developed between writing and vigilance. Attention was paid to 
nuances of life, mood, and reading, and the experience of oneself was 
intensified and widened by virtue of this act of writing. A whole field of 
experience opened which earlier was absent. 
A queered aesthetics of existence can also provide writer-researchers with 
tools to explore notions of sexual and gender difference in ways that produce more 
than a theoretical understanding. As Foucault (1978) argues, in his ground-breaking 
text The History of Sexuality, any strategy aimed at resisting the discursive 
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mechanisms of power that are engaged in the deployment of a narrowly defined 
sexuality, including mechanisms of repression, must involve a transgression of laws, a 
dismantling of prohibition and an ‘irruption of speech’ (5). Therefore, Foucault 
writes, ‘one cannot hope to obtain the desired results simply from… a theoretical 
discourse, however rigorously pursued’ (1978, p. 5). Thus, it is apparent that using 
non-theoretical ways of exploring and communicating the knowledges produced in 
life writing practice are appropriate and, furthermore, a means of equipping queer 
theory inspired life writers with ‘technologies of the self’ (Ramos 1994, p. 21) that 
resist heteronormative discourse and normative models of subjectivity.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter explored the ways the consumption (reading) and production (writing) of 
queer life writing might be understood as techniques in a Foucauldian ethics of the 
self. The chapter framed queer life writing as an intervention into the self or 
subjectivity and works of life writing as artefacts that both document this 
interventional process and express or disseminate new subjectivities arising from that 
process. The experience of reading and writing about one’s own and others’ lives can 
be understood as components in an ethics of the self (self-bricolage) or a practice of 
self-making. That is, the reading and making of life writing can lead to the production 
of new subjectivities, new identities. 
There are certain limits to positioning subjectivity as a core element to 
creative practice. It is crucial that the model of subjectivity used in a subjectivity-
centred creative practice is not one that entrenches rather than disrupts the notion of 
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subjectivity as stable, lasting and unified (Baker 2011). For a queered aesthetics of 
existence to be effective, the model of subjectivity deployed ‘must be one that 
destabilizes the notion of identity/subjectivity as unitary, fixed and somehow natural’ 
(Baker 2011, p. 15). A subjectivity-centred approach that views identity as natural and 
inherent to the subject, and sees the creative artefact as a direct reflection of the 
creator’s identity, is little more than a return to the essentialist model of the creative 
genius (Baker 2011).  
By deploying a model of subjectivity that destabilizes the notion of 
identity/subjectivity as unitary, fixed and somehow natural, a ‘queering of the self’—
facilitated by exposure to Queer Theory in the context of an aesthetics of existence—
can enrich and inform life writing practice; in effect bringing it into operation as 
radical self-bricolage. 
An ethics of the self, or self-bricolage through life writing, can be seen as a 
practice of liberty that has the potential to inform and alter the way subjects actively 
constitute themselves. Furthermore, the life writing arising out of a queered aesthetics 
of existence can act as ‘models’ that strongly influence the ongoing making and 
remaking, and ethical refinement, of queer subjectivities.  
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